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Essay
Medea and the Un-Man: Literary Guidance in the
Determination of Heinousness Under Maynard v.
Cartwrightt
Paul J. Heald*
JASON: ... Thou wife in every age
Abhorred, blood-red mother, who didst kill
My sons, and make me as the dead ....
M&D EA: I love the pain, so thou shalt laugh no more.
-Euripides1
FRATE ALBEP -O: Then he answered: "I am Frate Alberigo; I am
he of the evil garden's fruit, who here get date for fig."
DANTE. "Oh," I said, "are you too now dead?"
FRATE ALBERIGO: And he answered: "How my body is getting
along in the world above, I have no notion. This Ptolomea
is so privileged that often the soul falls down here before
Atropos releases it.... I now tell you that as soon as a
soul commits betrayal, as I did, its body is taken from it by
a demon, who then controls it until all its time on earth is
gone. The soul falls into this cistern here.
-Dante 2
t 486 U.S. 356 (1988).
* Associate Professor of Law, The University of Georgia School of Law. A.B. 1980, A.M.
1982, University of Illinois; J.D. 1988, University of Chicago. Many thanks to Albert Alschuler,
Milner Ball, Larry Biskowski, Joel Black, James Blitch, Lief Carter, Mark Cooney, Jill Crandall,
Bernard Dauenhauer, Christopher Eisgruber, David Gruning, Martha Nussbaum, David Skeel, Alan
Watson, and James B. White for their thoughtful comments on earlier versions of this Essay. Special
thanks also go to participants at the University of Illinois Comparative Literature Colloquium and the
University of Georgia Humanities Center Faculty Colloquium. I could not have written this Essay
without the friendship and support of Professor Michael Palencia-Roth, University of Illinois Depart-
ment of Comparative Literature.
1. EuRiPmEs, THE MEDEA 74-75 (Gilbert Murray trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1912).
2. DANTE AuOHIEIu, INFPzNO canto 33, at 285 (Allan Gilbert trans., Duke Univ. Press 1969)
[hereinafter DANTE].
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Ransom had the sense of watching an imitation of living motions
which had been very well studied and was technically correct: but
somehow it lacked the master touch. And he was chilled with an
inarticulate, night-nursery horror of the thing he had to deal
with-the managed corpse, the bogey, the Un-man.
-C.S. Lewis3
I.
In Love's Knowledge, Martha Nussbaum argues forcefully that "cer-
tain truths about human life can only be fittingly and accurately stated in
the language and forms characteristic of the narrative artist."' For her,
and probably for most of us who take literature seriously, the linear rheto-
ric of the logician cannot adequately describe nor convey the knowledge
necessary to address the question of how one should live. Although Nuss-
baum does not set forth as a foundationalist prescription any particular
"truths" she has found, she eloquently re-establishes an ethics of reading.
And, to the extent that the law involves making ethical judgments, she has
made an important point about jurisprudence as well by implying that some
knowledge essential to seeking justice has been most perfectly articulated
by artists.
In other words, some of the most relevant raw materials for solving
legal problems may be found in novels, poems, and drama. So far, most
"law and literature" efforts have not sought to bring art to bear on specific
legal questions.' Most academics have been content to apply their legal
expertise to interpret literary texts or to rehash postmodem debates over
foundationalism and moral relativism in the legal context.6 If we take
literature seriously, however, we may find that a poem is as relevant a
guide to the interpretation of a statute as a congressional committee report.
(If you've read many committee reports, you will not find this surprising.)
In particular, this Essay brings Dante, C.S. Lewis, and Euripides to
bear on a discrete problem examined by the U.S. Supreme Court in
3. C.S. LEsIS, PERELANDRA 126 (1947).
4. MARTHA C. NUSSAUM, LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE5 (1990).
5. But see David Luban, Some Greek Trials, 54 TENN. L. REv. 279, 321-22 (1987) (looking at
Homer, Hesiod, and Aeschylus to criticize the Model Code of Professional Responsibility); Martha C.
Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 83, 115-22 (1993) (applying ancient Greek dis-
cussions of mercy to American criminal law); Susan S. Heinzelman, Telling Stories and Breaking
Boundaries: Law, Literature and Feminism 7-15 (Jan. 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Texas Law Review) (applying Mexican mythology to a Texas murder case).
6. For a host of abstractions, see Symposium, Beyond Critique: Law, Culture, and the Politics of
Form, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1595 (1991). By stressing the violent implications of all legal discourse,
Robert Cover has pointedly criticized the high level of abstraction of "law and literature" scholarship.
See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE LJ. 1601, 1601-02 & n.2 (1986).
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Maynard v. Cartwright.7 Reading Dante's Inferno,' Lewis's Perelandra,9
and Euripides's Medea' provides guidance in responding to the Court's
mandate that the state channel discretion in capital sentencing." Specifi-
cally, these works imply an ethical framework for determining what consti-
tutes an "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel"" murder. Other literary
texts are certainly relevant to Maynard." This Essay, however, is not an
attempt to survey comprehensively and distill the insights provided by all
relevant material, but rather an attempt to demonstrate and defend a meth-
od of applying literary texts to concrete legal problems. Even if my spe-
cific conclusions about Maynard do not ultimately prove to be convincing,
especially to those who categorically oppose capital punishment,' I hope
my methodology is independently defensible.
Although the discussion of literature and Maynard forms the core of
this Essay, a preliminary comparison of Nussbaum's approach to literature
with that of other prominent commentators helps to place my claims into
context. Nussbaum's approach to literature differs from that of James
Boyd White or Stanley Fish, for example. Because I rely primarily on
Nussbaum for justifying the integration of law and literature, a brief
contrast of their approaches should illuminate the position taken in this
Essay.
II.
AlthoughLove's Knowledge does not dwell directly on the relationship
between law and literature, Nussbaum refocuses the recent debate, as ex-
emplified here by White, Fish, and Lief Carter. White writes that "law is
best regarded not as a kind of social science but as one of the humani-
ties.... [T]he life of the law is thus a life of art, the art of making
7. 486 U.S. 356 (1988). In Maynard, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the "especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel" aggravating factor is unconstitutionally vague as applied in Oklahoma's capital sen-
tencing scheme. Id. at 363-64.
8. DANTE, supra note 2.
9. LEwIs, supra note 3.
10. EURIPMES, supra note 1.
11. See Maynard, 486 U.S. at 362-64 (requiring that the state must channel jury discretion with
more than vague statutory language).
12. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.12(4) (1991).
13. See, e.g., ALBERTCAMUs, THESTRANoER (Stuart Gilbert trans., VintageBooks 1954) (1942);
IRVING STONE, CLARENCE DARROW: FOR THE DEHNSE 414-17 (1941) (describing Clarence Darrow's
closing argument in defense of Leopold and Loeb); RICHARD WRIGHT, NATIVE SON (1940). The
works of the Marquis de Sade and Thomas de Quincy, among many others, also spring to mind.
14. This Essay presumes the death penalty is constitutional and will continue to be employed for
the foreseeable future. All my conclusions are bounded by this given, which, perhaps unfortunately,
appears accurately to describe the current state of legal affairs. What literature has to say about capital
punishment itself is another essay.
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meaning in language with others."15 Law and art are both processes
through which we constitute ourselves in community with others-
languages through which we create meaning in our lives. The language of
law, of course, often entails the violence of the state. In spite of the
differences in the direct political impact of legal and literary discourse,
however, the rhetoric and substance of both are equally important to cre-
ating and maintaining community. The institutional separation of law and
the humanities is, therefore, artificial and potentially impoverishing to both
disciplines. For White, breaking down distinctions between the two should
be the main goal of a law and literature movement.16
White focuses on both law and literature as processes. They should
be studied together in order to understand and recognize the legitimacy of
the multitude of voices in our community. The importance of his work lies
in his examination of the functions of legal and literary discourse and his
endorsement of the virtues of tolerance, pluralism, and constitutive rheto-
ric. He does not, however, make clear the justification for privileging
these values.
By contrast, although Stanley Fish applauds White's process-oriented,
integrationist approach to both literature and law, he finds fault with
"White's hopes for the law [that] are not rhetorical, but transcendental." 17
Like White, he recognizes doctrinal inconsistency and linguistic indetermin-
acy, but nonetheless appreciates the pragmatic success of the law and the
constraints of professionalism. Fish does not, however, as he accuses
White of doing, "look[] forward to a time when all parties will lay down
their forensic arms and join together in the effort to build a new and more
rational community."18 An appreciation of the artistic nature of the legal
endeavor will not increase the number of "just" laws or "just" judicial
decisions, or nurture a more "just" community. As an objective matter,
Fish would deny that the word "justice" itself has any fixed, noncontextual
meaning. White would also deny a fixed content for justice in the sense
that a bicameral legislature might be called "most just"; however, he
clearly privileges tolerance and pluralism to such an extent that a somewhat
objective notion of justice might be implied. This hint of objectivism leads
Fish to admonish White to cease having progressive hopes for the interest-
ing relationship he has described.
15. JAMES B. WHITE, HERACLES' BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIc AND POETICS OF THE LAW
xii (1985).
16. Id. at 122-25.
17. Stanley Fish, The Law Wishes to Have a Fonnal Existence, in THE FATE OF LAW 159, 201
(Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1991).
18. Id. Fish's interpretation of White's views may be overstated. White has recently written, "I
don't know where Stanley Fish got [this] idea .... I have never said such a thing, nor do I think it."
Letter from James B. White, Professor, The University of Michigan, to Paul Heald, Associate Profes-
sor, The University of Georgia School of Law (July 7, 1993) (on file with the author).
574 [Vol. 73:571
HeinOnline -- 73 Tex. L. Rev.  574 1994-1995
1995] Literary Guidance in the Determination of Heinousness 575
In a slightly different vein, Lief Carter suggests that recognizing law
as an art form implicates another possible standard by which to measure
justice.19 Although he does not offer an absolute objective standard, he
notes that judicial opinions productively bear aesthetic scrutiny.' The
legal aesthetic examines the "fit" between the "raw experiences" of the
community and "common pattern[s] in the way we think."21 Some ju-
dicial decisions fit better than others, for the same reasons that some
artistic performances please the audience more than others: "The good per-
formance creates in that audience a belief that it shares a communal ex-
perience ... . 'Doing justice' is a subset of this phenomenon."' Even
though our politics may be offended by a particular decision-Justice Har-
lan himself clearly disapproved of the protester he vindicated in Cohenp-
or our moral sense may be at odds with the message of a particular work
of art-some of my atheist friends love Faur6's Mass-our aesthetic sense
may nonetheless be able to appreciate voices in conflict with our own.
Carter echoes White in his call for a peaceful turf on which to argue
and to recognize our unique positions.2 Our differences make consensus
unlikely, but a. move toward an aesthetics of decisionmaking and away
from fixation on pure ideological or technological correctness (ends dis-
course) will improve the quality of legal discourse. Like White, however,
Carter fails to explain adequately his privileging of plural voices and
peaceful discourse as the core of his aesthetics. He would reject the
suggestion that the Niirnberg rallies in any sense "did justice," and yet they
were undoubtedly a profoundly "share[d] ... communal experience. " '
Aesthetic considerations, as opposed to ethical ones, do not obviously
demand the inclusion of plural (nonracist) voices.
White, Fish, and Carter are representative of many who integrate law
and literature.' They focus on process and function-how law works,
19. LIEF H. CARTER, CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONALLAWMAKING: THE SUPREME COURTAND
THE ART OF PoITIcs 13 (1985).
20. Id. at 13.
21. Id. at 162.
22. Id. at 151.
23. See Cohenv. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (upholding a protestor's First Amendment right
to wear a jacket emblazoned with the slogan "Fuck the Draft").
24. CARTER, supra note 19, at 137-39.
25. See id. at 151.
26. See, e.g., RIcHARD H. WEIsBERG, POurHmCs 3-47 (1992) (noting similarities between meta-
phors and other literary devices used in poetry and those used in law, including the personification of
abstractions); Owen Barfield, Poetic Diction and Legal Fiction, in ESSAYs PRESENTED TO CHARLES
WLLIAMS 106, 121 (1947) (formalizing the relationship as "metaphor: language: meaning:: legal fic-
tion: law: social life"); Thomas D. Eisele, The Activity of Being a Lawyer: The Imaginative Pursuit of
Implications and Possibilities, 54 TENN. L. REV. 345, 360-61,355-65 (1987) (examining, as one way
of understanding the activity of lawyering, the implications of a paradigm that "imagines the ...
lawyer... to be a worker in words, an author and a reader" whose activities are fundamentally lin-
guistic).
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how literature works. Although White and Carter might be interpreted as
hinting at external substantive norms (plurality, tolerance, and peaceful
discourse) that could be used to judge when law or literature is "working"
well, all three avoid traditional ethical language. They are not expressly
engaged in an Aristotelian search for "justice" or "the good." They are
wary of any projects tainted with objectivist notions. Such projects claim-
ig to have the "truth" or to know what "justice" demands have too fre-
quently justified political and moral atrocities. The current goal of legal
philosophy seems to be to establish a jurisprudence that denies validity to
atrocity and nihilism, while avoiding ethical discourse.
In Love's Knowledge, Nussbaum demonstrates an ethics of reading,
the possibility of ethical discourse that makes no grand, oppressive (or
monopolistic) claim to the truth. She asserts that literature is worth
studying for reasons other than to scrutinize the literary process or the art
of rhetoric.' Every work of art contains clues as to how we should live.
We read not primarily to find out something about the process of writing,
but to decide how to act and think, to encounter "certain truths" available
nowhere else. We read to become wiser. Her position, of course, is
as old as Aristotle (on whom she frequently relies'), but it seems fresh
in the face of postmodern skepticism.
Inspired by Nussbaum's project, this Essay suggests that ethical consi-
derations provide the primary justification for giving literature a more
prominent role in legal decisionmaking. To illustrate, Part III explores
how reading Dante, Lewis, and Euripides can heighten the level of ethical
discourse in the consideration of what constitutes an especially heinous and
cruel murder for the purposes of Maynard v. Cartwright. Part IV exam-
ines the limits of applying literature to law, referencing Pascal in an effort
to emphasize the modesty of the claims that can be made for the enterprise.
II.
A.
In 1982, William Cartwright entered the home of his ex-employer,
Hugh Riddle, to commit murder. As he made his way down the hall
toward the living room where Riddle watched television, he encountered
Riddle's wife, Charma, whom he shot twice in the legs. After killing his
27. See, e.g., Steven L. Winter, Human Values in a Postmodern World, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
233 (1994).
28. See NuSsAUM, supra note 4, at 5 (asserting as one purpose of studying literature the
examination of "the contribution made by certain works of literature to the exploration of some
important questions about human beings and human life').
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., id. at 47.
576 [Vol. 73:571
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ex-boss in the living room, he went back down the hall and found Mrs.
Riddle trying to call the police. He stabbed her twice, slit her throat, and
left her to die. 1 She survived, and on the basis of her testimony,3'
Cartwright was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to die in the
Oklahoma electric chair.33
Oklahoma, like most states with the death penalty, requires the sen-
tencing authority to weigh a specific list of statutory aggravating circum-
stances against mitigating evidence that the convicted murderer offers.'
In Cartwright's case, the jury found two aggravating circumstances, one of
which was that the murder was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cru-
el."3" On appeal, Cartwright challenged Oklahoma's heinousness factor
as unconstitutionally overbroad.' He argued that the statutory language,
which was read to the jurors, did not adequately confine the jurors' dis-
cretion.37 How is a jury to guess what the legislature means by an "espe-
cially heinous murder" as opposed to a "just-plain-vanilla heinous mur-
der"? The language invited, according to Cartwright, the sort of arbitrary,
capricious, and standardless sentencing scheme struck down in Godfrey v.
Georgia." Godfrey held essentially that when a life is at stake, the
sentencer cannot be given an open opportunity to condemn for whatever
reason it pleases.39
In vacating Cartwright's sentence, the Supreme Court affirmed
Godfrey's requirement that the state must channel jury discretion with more
than vague statutory language.' It refused, however, to strike down the
statute on its face. Instead, it suggested that the heinousness factor could
be constitutionally applied in light of a limiting judicial construction or
statutory amendment that would flesh out what was meant by "especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel.""' The sentencer, either judge or jury, must
be told more precisely what sort of murders fit the bill.
31. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 358 (1988).
32. See Cartwright v. State, 695 P.2d 548, 551 (Okla. Crim. App.) (discussing the testimony at
trial of Charma Riddle), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 911 (1985).
33. Maynard, 486 U.S. at 358-59.
34. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, J 701.11 (1991).
35. Id. § 701.12(4). Many jurisdictions include "heinousness" or something like it as an
aggravating circumstance. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(h) (West Supp. 1995) ("especial-
ly heinous, atrocious, or cruel"); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702(c)(5) (1994) ("especially heinous,
cruel, or depraved"); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(7) (Michie 1990) ("outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible, or inhuman").
36. Maynard, 486 U.S. at 359.
37. Id. at 361-62.
38. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
39. Id. at 428-29.
40. Maynard, 486 U.S. at 362-64.
41. Id. at 364, 364-65.
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The heart of the opinion mandates that states do a better job of sorting
out the kinds of murderers who deserve to be executed from those who do
not. The Court refused to perform the task itself-it was unwilling to hold,
for example, that the jury could find heinousness as an aggravating factor
only if torture or serious physical abuse were present.42 Instead, the
Court invited the states to tell stories to their sentencers about what kind
of people should die. The content of these stories would be basically up
to judges or legislatures, but the sentencer's discretion must be guided by
the story told.'
The Court had earlier, in a number of decisions beginning with
Lockett v. Ohio,' authorized defendants to tell their own stories: stories
about their childhoods, their religious conversions, their experiences in
prison, their addictions-anything that might remotely be considered miti-
gating in the eyes of the sentencer.45 The state typically must plead and
prove the existence of at least one enumerated statutory aggravating fac-
tor,' but the defendant may offer character evidence that falls outside the
mitigating factors specifically listed in the capital sentencing statute.47 .
The defendant usually seeks to make himself a more sympathetic individual
in the eyes of the sentencer. In requiring the admission of such evidence,
the Court has already invited the sentencer to listen to one sort of death-
time story.
The state's tale is usually different. Under Cartwright, it must cate-
gorize defendants rather than individualize them. It asks the question
whether the defendant is the type of person who should be executed. When
states address this ethical question, literature can become relevant. Fiction
contains a huge repository of stories about who should live and who should
die, what is good and what is evil, what is heinous and what is merely,
pathetic. Because we constitute ourselves though art and law, both artists
and lawmakers spend considerable time pondering the fates of those who
transgress societal norms. To give content to the term "heinous," a judge
might just as plausibly look to fiction as to a dictionary or to history,
legislative or otherwise.
In fact, given the narrowness of our actual experiences, perhaps resort
to fiction should be mandated. In considering the relevance of fiction to
living, Nussbaum ponders:
But why not life itself? Why can't we investigate whatever we want
to investigate by living and reflecting on [life]? Why, if it is the
42. Id. at 365.
43. Id. at 364-65.
44. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
45. Id. at 604-05 (plurality opinion).
46. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2)-(3) (West 1985).
47. Locket, 438 U.S. at 604-07 (plurality opinion).
[Vol. 73:571
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Aristotelian ethical conception we wish to scrutinize, can't we do that
without literary texts, without texts at all ....
One obvious answer was suggested already by Aristotle: we
have never lived enough. Our experience is, without fiction, too
confined and too parochial.'
In her commentary on Kant's theory of political judgment, Hannah Arendt
describes a similar process:
The "enlargement of the mind" plays a crucial role in the Critique
of Judgment. It is accomplished by "comparing our judgment with
the possible rather than the actual judgment of others, and by putting
ourselves in the place of any other man." The faculty which makes
this possible is called imagination .... [By] force of imagination it
makes the others present and thus moves potentially in a space which
is public, open to all sides; in other words, it adopts the position of
Kant's world citizen. To think with the enlarged mentality-that
means you train your imagination to go visiting.49
In the hope of enlarging our understanding through a mix of fiction and
historical examples, I would like to tell the following Maynard stories for
the state.
B.
When Dante nears the end of his journey through Hell and finally
reaches the lake of ice that surrounds the trunk of Satan himself, Dante
encounters a special group of murderers whose acts were so evil that they
merit punishment in the lowest circle of the great pit. They are the killers
of kin and guests-frozen in eternal torment. In pausing to speak with
Friar Alberigo, whose servants murdered his dinner guests upon his signal
to serve dessert (hence the reference to figs at the beginning of his
speech'), Dante expresses surprise that the Friar is already dead. In fact,
the Friar's body is not really dead at all, although his soul resides in Hell.
His body, now possessed by a demon, is alive and well and committing
who knows what sort of horrors on the populace of Italy.5" His irredeem-
ably corrupt soul has perished, leaving behind a husk of unspeakable evil.
We encounter the husk itself in C.S. Lewis's Perelandra, not the shell
of Friar Alberigo, but the body vacated by the fictional physicist, Dr.
48. NUSSBAUM, supra note 4, at 47.
49. 2 HANNAH ARENDT, THE LIFE OF THE MIND 257 (Mary McCarthy ed., 1978) (quoting
IMMANUL KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT (1790)).
50. See DANTE, supra note 2, canto 33, at 285 ("I am he of the evil garden's fruit, who here get
date for fig."); see also supra text accompanying note 2.
51. See DANTE, supra note 2, canto 33, at 285 ("How my body is getting along in the world
above, I have no notion."); see also supra text accompanying note 2.
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Weston. Bloated by his fabulous scientific success, Weston has committed
the ultimate sin of making himself into God.5' He admits he is fully ca-
pable of genocide to advance what he describes as the spirit of the uni-
verse.53 Just before his soul vacates his body, Weston raves to Lewis's
hero, Dr. Ransom:
There is no possible distinction in concrete thought between me and
the universe. In so far as I am the conductor of the central forward
pressure of the universe, I am it. Do you see, you timid, scruple-
mongering fool? I am the Universe. I, Weston, am your God and
your Devil. I call that Force into me completely.'
At the moment of invocation, Weston's personality is gone in a violent
contorting shudder, but his body remains, the Un-man, an empty yet terri-
fying creature of purposeful violence against which Ransom wages a pas-
sionate struggle for the rest of the novel.
Unfortunately for us, the Un-man is not only an imaginary creature,
a character from fiction. We find him purposefully searching the streets
and countryside for vulnerable women to rape, torture, and murder. He
visits the comer convenience store and calmly shoots the teenage clerk in
the back of the head when he turns to empty the till. He has led nations
and political movements. When he is caught, he often describes his acts
in the third person. Psychologists who interview him frequently note the
"inappropriate affect" exhibited by the Un-man when discussing the
crime-the trademark monotone, the emotionless recitation of acts of delib-
erate annihilation.'5 Joe Aloi, a private investigator who helped the
infamous serial killer Theodore Robert Bundy in one of his murder de-
fenses, described the "altered state" Bundy would seem to enter when he
discussed one of his serial killings. According to Aloi, Bundy would emit
a strong odor, freezing those around him in fear.56 In the eyes of many,
when Bundy was executed in 1989, the State of Florida switched off a
managed corpse-the person inside had disappeared long before.
Dante and Lewis may help us describe one sort of murderer the state
could identify as meriting capital punishment. They provide an illustration
of what "heinousness" could mean for the purposes of Maynard, an insight
that focuses on a rare type who embraces and nurtures the darkest side of
human nature-one who develops a taste for killing. Before developing
52. LEwis, supra note 3, at 97.
53. Id. at 96-97.
54. Id. at 97.
55. See, e.g., Myra MacPherson, The Roots of Evil, VAlITY FAIR, May 1989, at 140, 196
("[Ted] Bundy, like other serial killers, dehumanizedhis victims, seeing them as only symbolic objects
to 'hunt.'"). See generally STEPHEN G. MICHAUD & HUGH AYNESWORTH, TED BUNDY,
CONVERSATIONS WITH A KILLER (1989).
56. MacPherson, supra note 55, at 190.
[Vol. 73:571
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further the attributes of the Un-man and discussing the practical dangers
and theoretical problems of using Dante and Lewis, let me tell another
story-the myth of Medea, wife of Jason and murderess of their chil-
dren.57 Whatever her faults, Medea is not an Un-person-in fact, few
murderers are. This does not necessarily mean she deserves mercy.
Maynard does not say who should live and who should die, but the telling
of the Medea myth, in conjunction with the myth of the Un-man, clarifies
and refines the state's options in defining heinousness.
After Jason and Medea flee from I6clos, where Jason has failed to re-
gain his deposed father's throne after completing his quest for the Golden
Fleece, they come to Corinth where King Creon offers Jason the hand of
his daughter. Jason, who owes his life and virtually all his accomplish-
ments to the help of Medea, but whose wealth is depleted and who is tired
after years of wandering, accepts Creon's offer. He claims to Medea that
he does not love his attractive young betrothed, but that he is strategically
doing what is best for Medea and their children. In her anger over his
betrayal, she kills Creon's daughter and her own children.
Medea's anguish goes far beyond mere jealousy. She has given up
everything in her obsessive devotion to Jason. When he arrived in her
barbarian home of Colchis on his quest, she fell in love with him and
enabled him to defeat her family. Without her help, he could not have
taken the Golden Fleece and recovered the soul of his kinsman Phrixus, as
demanded by Pelias, his father's usurper. Because she needed to kill her
own brother to prevent him from ambushing Jason, she fled Colchis with
Jason and the Argonauts. She proved an invaluable addition to his crew
as his ship wandered its way home to I6clos. Unfortunately, once Jason
arrived back home to his civilized Greek city-state, Medea's violent deter-
mination to advance Jason's interests backfired and resulted in their exile
to Corinth after her killing of King Pelias.
Despite the obsessive nature of Medea's love, she remains, at least in
part, a sympathetic character, especially in the face of Jason's eagerness to
abandon her. Jason provides one of fiction's first examples of male mid-
life crisis. The quest of his youth has been completed. What can he look
forward to, other than bedding an aging wife, watching his sons grow, and
continuing the struggle to survive? How can he resist a beautiful young
princess and a chance to see his children on the throne of Corinth? One
can hardly fault Jason for being tempted. Medea's attendant confronts her
nurse's surprise at Jason's behavior by declaring: "[W]hat man on earth
is different?"58 But Jason is tempted by more than a young body. He is
57. EuRIPMas, supra note 1.
58. Id. at7.
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tempted by the illusion that he can both have his new life and discharge the
enormous debt he owes Medea.
Jason will not admit that he is a traitor. As Medea exclaims, "'Tis
but of all man's inward sicknesses / The vilest, that he knoweth not of
shame .... ,5 He clings stubbornly to the illusion that Medea and their
children will be better off after the marriage. He never admits that he is
attracted to Creon's daughter. He tries to turn his treachery into a favor:
Yet, even so, I will not hold my hand
From succouring mine own people. Here am I
To help thee, woman, pondering heedfully
Thy new state. For I would not have thee flung
Provisionless away-aye, and the young
Children as well; nor lacking aught that will
Of mine can bring thee. Many a lesser ill
Hangs on the heels of exile.... Aye, and though
Thou hate me, dream not that my heart can know
Or fashion aught of angry will to thee.W°
Like many modern American men, Jason believes that if he pays his child
support and remains civil to his abandoned family, he may blithely start a
new life. No responsibility need be taken for the severing of old ties.
Jason's failure to acknowledge the legitimacy of Medea's pain pro-
vokes her ultimate act of violence-the stabbing deaths of their two chil-
dren. Having tried all manner of words, murder becomes the way to make
Jason feel her pain. To the surprise of no one who has seen this story
played out on a less epic scale, Jason's blindness remains even in the face
of the horrific result of his faithlessness. He takes no responsibility for the
tragedy. Looking back, Jason (but not the audience) finds Medea accursed
and wicked from the beginning: She has not killed because of his abandon-
ment, but because she was evil from the day they met. His response to the
murder is not insight into Medea's tortured soul. He does not see her as
the victim she wants to be. Rather, he rejects her entire being as poison-
ous. Medea has not only murdered her children but also finished the pro-
cess by which Jason blinded himself both to reality and to his own respon-
sibility for Medea's crimes.
In fact, Medea's love for Jason was probably never very healthy.
Healthy love does not lead a woman to kill her brother, at least one king,
the daughter of another, and her own two children. But the issue here is
not whether Medea is culpable-she is. The question is whether the play
sheds any light on how a state should describe a heinous murder. Should
the murder of Medea's children be described as "especially heinous" for
59. Id. at27.
60. Id. at 26-27.
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the purposes of Maynard v. Cartwright? This point is especially relevant
in that Medea is not any more a purely mythic character than the Un-
man.
6 1
According to Jungian critics, Medea is so common, so much a part of
every person, that she can easily stand for the archetype of the wronged
feminine in both women and men.62 For Jung, the feminine represents
the part of a personality that seeks connection with others, that casts its lot
with mate, friends, and family, that seeks meaning in relationship rather
than material accomplishment.' When a relationship is severed, and par-
ticularly when the wrong goes unacknowledged, Medea raises her head.
"If only my spouse knew what pain he was causing me, I'm sure he would
stop." Obviously, most Jason-like wrongings of the feminine do not result
in murder, but sometimes they do. Spouses, ex-spouses, and ex-lovers
sometimes pay a lethal last visit to their families." Fired workers (those
who have a greater emotional investment in their jobs than I do) return to
work one last time to kill their employers or co-workers.'
The problem with executing Medea is that we know her too well. Al-
though the obsessiveness of her love pushes her much further out of control
than any reader of this Essay is likely to get, we empathize with her. Do
we dare execute an archetype of our own pain? Might we not diminish
ourselves in the process? The Court's decision in Maynard does not pro-
vide us with an answer to that question; however, it does imply that a state
should at least ask it. Irrespective of the answer chosen by the state, read-
ing Euripides helps us describe and identify a type of murderer that differs
significantly from the Un-man.
Having discussed Medea in relatively familiar terms, improving our
description of the Un-man seems more difficult. Neither Dante nor Lewis
lets us into the Un-man's mind-if they think he even has one.' Perhaps
a fuller description of the interior life of the Un-man would prick our
61. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Serpents in the Soul: A Reading of Seneca's Medea, in PuRsuITs
OF REASON: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF STANLEY CAVELL 307, 330 (Ted Cohen et al. eds., 1993) (noting
the real life connection between violence and erotic love).
62. Cf. JOHN A. SANFORD & GEORGE LOUGH, WHAT MEN ARE LiKE 140, 136-41 (1988) (survey-
ing the archetypal powers of major Greek goddesses in order to emphasize "the scope and importance
... of the feminine archetype in a man's psychology"). My presentation of the facts of the Medea
myth is heavily influenced by Sanford.
63. Id. at 149, 131-50 (noting that the feminine side of a man-the anima-"gives a man heart,
enabling him to be courageous in the face of life's burdens and afflictions" (emphasis in original)).
64. See, e.g., Bill Harmon, Retired Cop Charged in Slaying: Police Say the Former Officer
Stabbed His Estranged Wife Four or Five Tines, TAMPA TRIB., Jan. 17, 1995, at 1.
65. See, e.g., Doron P. Levin, Slayings at Michigan Post Office Spur a Review of All Employees,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1991, at 6.
66. For an interesting attempt, see ANNE RICE, THE TALE OF THE BODY THIEF 11-23 (1992) (de-
scribing the thoughts and impulses of a killer-the Un-man-as sensed by the book's narrator, a vam-
pire).
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sympathies as much as the Medea story. Our view of the Un-man is cloud-
ed by his own unwillingness or inability to describe his motivation.67 Ted
Bundy, the prototypical Un-man for the purposes of this Essay, sheds a
little light. He responded to the following question about his need to
"possess" his victims:
[INTERVIEWER]: Would the feeling of physical possession be
met, or satisfied... if the victim was unconscious or dead?
BUNDY:... I think we see a point reached-slowly, perhaps-where
the control, the possession aspect, came to include, uh, uh, within its
demands, the necessity ... for the purposes of gratification ... the
killing of the victim .... Perhaps it came to be seen that the ultimate
possession was, in fact, the taking of the life. And then the purely...
physical possession of the remains."
Bundy savored the God-like power of exerting ultimate control over
another human being. Perhaps the Un-man is the murderer who enjoys
killing for its own sake. Although our understanding of the Un-man is still
incomplete, Dante and Lewis are clearly attempting to describe a different
kind of murderer than Euripides is.
Before discussing whether the state, having separated Medea and the
Un-man, should treat them differently, we should note potential difficulties
with using literature to answer the question. For example, the state should
not abstract from Dante and Lewis and tell its sentencers that especially
evil and inhuman murderers merit the death penalty. To do so would au-
thorize the same sort of ambiguous and standardless charge that does not
guide discretion and that has frequently led to an overabundance of ethnic
minorities on death row (those of different races are too easily perceived
to be inhumane). Aristotelian ethics would suggest that the safeguard and
usefulness of the stories lies in their particularity.' ° The specific imagery
of Dante and Lewis, the "night-nursery horror ... of the managed
corpse"7' in all its vividness, identifies a very special type of killer. The
point cannot be made too emphatically that what is most true in literature
is most potent in the particular expression of the work itself. Even talking
about Dante and Lewis as we have is one step removed from the power of
67. Unlike Medea, who explains to Jason, "I love the pain, so thou shalt laugh no more."
EURIPIDES, supra note 1, at 75.
68. Hugh Aynesworth &Stephen 0. Michaud,A Kilter's Words, VANITY FAIR, May 1989, at 146,
147 (transcript of interview) (emphasis in original).
69. See Nussbaum, supra note 5, at 114, 113-14 (stating that "a discretionary approach on the part
of judges will frequently be harsher to defendants-especially minority defendants-than will an
approach based on strict rules").
70. See Nussbaum, supra note 56, at 338 (arguing of Medea that "it is only in [this particular
story] that the limits of Aristotelianism can be clearly seen").
71. LE is, supra note 3, at 126.
[Vol. 73:571
HeinOnline -- 73 Tex. L. Rev.  584 1994-1995
1995] Literary Guidance in the Determination of Heinousness 585
the original works.' Law and literature works best when we stay with
particular literary works, talk about narrow legal questions, and avoid the
real dangers of making literature merely part of the competitive rhetoric of
law.
For this reason, literature and myth may be most appropriately inte-
grated by an appellate judge reviewing a trial court's finding of heinous-
ness. An appellate judge, removed from the impassioned argumentation
of the courtroom, may be better able to apply dispassionately the lessons
taught by literature. And through the institution of the written opinion, the
logos of decision, conversation about confining the sentencer's discretion
can be carried on by judges within the case law. This institutionalized
narrative may incorporate the stories of Medea and the Un-man less dan-
gerously than the relatively unconstrained speechmaking of lawyers before
juries.
Of course, these stories may be integrated into the legal process before
other audiences. The story of Medea and the Un-man might be told to a
judge before she drafts her instructions to a jury, to a district attorney
considering whether to seek the death penalty,73 to a legislature consider-
ing an amendment to its capital sentencing scheme, to a class of law stu-
dents struggling with their own ethical sensibilities, or to literature students
threatened with marginalization by a culture that finds little pragmatic use
for literary criticism. We should not presume that the only useful legal
audience for art is the jury.
But what art? What stories? Another danger lies in the misconception
that a particular canon of works would provide the "correct" solution to
legal problems.74 Dante, Lewis, and Euripides do not provide the last
word in the heinousness debate. Other works are probably equally or more
relevant. The assertion made in this Essay is that reading increases
wisdom-not that the truth is confined to a particular list of books, poems,
or plays. Dante, Lewis, and Euripides challenge us, increase our options,
raise our consciousness, and trouble us. They make us wiser. But they
are not the only authors capable of enriching our understanding.
The life of the law, however, may not always need'enrichment. Per-
haps the integration of law and literature will only muddy the water and
make decisionmaking more complex. Dante, Lewis, and Euripides do not
72. See WE3SBERo, supra note 26, at 5 ("We can rearticulate... words to state their meaning,
but we know that not only their beauty is thereby impoverished; the meaning itselfis lessened through
each restatement." (emphasis in original)).
73. See Heinzelman, supra note 5, at 9 (describing a Texas district attorney's decision to charge
the killer of a child with capital murder).
74. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norns and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Serious
Moral Error?, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1929, 1955-56 (1991) (suggesting that the legal literary canons are
comprised of a body of works representing a narrow range of interests).
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provide crystal-clear answers. Literature may have a disruptive and desta-
bilizing influence. Bringing increased complexity to the law, however, is
not necessarily problematic. Rendering the answer to a particular question
less black and white is beneficial if we have been oversimplifying. For
instance, before reading Medea, one could much more easily define multi-
ple child murder as per se heinous. Destabilization of existing decision-
making models may be a good thing. We proceed ethically even if the
wisdom sought in literature makes decisionmaking more, rather than less,
agonizing. More information should be desirable, although any informa-
tion, derived from literature or otherwise, potentially can be abused.
Finally, we need to be wary of the information we purport to glean
from a work. Medea was written long ago in a very different cultural con-
text. The danger of taking a work out of context is manifest. We must try
to distinguish what Euripides is saying about Greek culture in particular
from what he is saying about human nature in general. This is often a dif-
ficult, if not impossible, task. And yet, it is the routine work of the law.
By keeping historical and cultural contexts in mind, competent judges and
academics learn much from decades or even centuries-old precedent. The
Thorns Case still teaches students the fundamentals of tort law. The
point here is not that all legal commentators perfectly distill the truth from
culturally distant texts, but rather that our current system flourishes in spite
of contextual limitations in the case law and faces no greater problem in
considering literature. In other words, the argument against the legitimacy
of using texts as distant as those of Euripides proves too much.
C.
A question has been left hanging concerning the precise use the state
should make of the stories told by Dante, Lewis, and Euripides. With the
aforementioned caveats in mind, let us examine whether Medea should be
treated differently than the Un-man in light of post-Maynard developments
in the law. The response to Maynard by state courts has been mixed. The
cases evidence two sorts of approaches. For example, the Arizona
Supreme Court has defined "especially heinous, cruel or depraved" to
identify a "perpetrator [who] inflicts mental anguish or physical abuse
before the victim's death" or who "relishes the murder, evidencing debase-
ment or perversion" or "shows an indifference to the suffering of the
victim and evidences a sense of pleasure" in the crime.7' This narrowing
language was approved by the U.S. Supreme Court in Walton v.
75. Y.B. 6 Edw. 4, fol. 7, pl. 18 (1466), reprinted in RICHARD A. EPS TIN, CASES AND
MATERIAS ON TORTS 62 (5th ed. 1990). Students in Epstein's first-year torts class report that he has
sometimes spent more than a week on this ancient two-page case.
76. State v. Walton, 769 P.2d 1017, 1032-33 (Ariz. 1989), aft'd, 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
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Arizona.' Although far from a model of clarity, this language suggests
an emphasis on the mental state of the murderer that complements the
foregoing discussion of Lewis. The Un-man characteristically relishes the
murder or exhibits the type of "indifference toward the suffering of the
victim"' that the Walton court focuses on.
Florida, on the other hand, focuses somewhat more on the category
of crime, holding rather consistently, for example, that the sentencer can
infer heinousness as a matter of law from the strangling of a conscious-
but not semiconscious-victim. "  The Court approved of this crime-
specific approach in Sochor v. Florida.'° A reconsideration of Dante,
Lewis, and Euripides helps frame the question whether line drawing should
be based on the type of crime or the mental state of the defendant.
In his organization of Hell in Inferno, Dante tends to categorize sin-
ners by type of sin. Panderers are together in one level; adulterers have
their own place; gluttons, usurers, and others all suffer torment commensu-
rate to their sort of sin. Medea, perhaps, is down with Friar Alberigo,
frozen in the ice for killing her own kin.8 We do not know whether
Dante would have considered her an Un-person-he gives no indication
whether all killers of guests and kin descend to Hell before their bodies
perish. At first glance, his cosmology might support Florida's categoriza-
tion of murderers by type of crime-for example, stranglers of conscious
victims should be treated the same as far as the determination of heinous-
ness is concerned.'
Lewis, on the other hand, seems initially to be more concerned with
the mental states of individuals he depicts. He describes the original and
greatest sin (and in a sense the only sin) as purely one of mental state-
making oneself God. The serpent told Adam that eating from the tree of
knowledge would make him like God. Being like God makes anything
possible, and those who exercise the most God-like power may lose their
humanity altogether. Although Lewis's imagery is primarily biblical, Ted
Bundy echoed these themes in interviews when he described his mental
77. 497 U.S. 639, 654-55 (1990).
78. Walton, 769 P.2d at 1033.
79. See Sochor v. State, 580 So. 2d 595, 603 (Fla. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 112 S. Ct.
2114 (1992); see also Cannady v. State, 620 So. 2d 165, 169 (Fla. 1993) (holding that a quick shot
to the heart was not heinous because the victim had no forewarning).
80. 112 S. Ct. 2114, 2121 (1992).
81. Dante does not explicitly place Medea in Hell in the Inferno, although she is referenced in the
Canto that consigns Jason to the level where seducers are punished. DANTE, supra note 2, canto 18,
at 147.
82. We will see later, however, that this use of Inferno is unconvincing and provides an example
of how literature can be misused-a misuse that, nonetheless, can be persuasively rebutted. See infra
text accompanying notes 94-95.
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state as he killed and mutilated young women.' Just as Lewis's Profes-
sor Weston eventually identified himself with the universal life force,
Bundy sought to possess life itself through killing. A focus on how Bundy
killed, sometimes hitting the victim on the back of the head with a tire iron
before she knew what was happening, as opposed to his mental state while
he killed, fails to name fully the evil that ended in the Florida electric chair
in 1989.
A reading of Dante and Lewis illustrates the significance of the choice
between a bright-line rule treating identically all those who commit certain
types of crimes-multiple victims, strangulation of the conscious, and
others-and an ad hoc inquiry focused on the mental state of the murderer.
In which direction should we channel sentencing discretion? Using Medea
as an example, should the sentencer find the act of infanticide per se
heinous (if we are going to have per se rules, certainly multiple child
murder is likely to be one of them), or should the sentencer be directed to
look first into her soul? Although literature has proven useful in framing
this question (and that alone justifies its use), it may prove equally useful
in suggesting an answer.
Let us pose the question in light of two real cases. The State of
Florida executed two men in the spring of 1989 for killing young girls:
Theodore Robert Bundy and Aubrey Dennis Adams. While clerking for
a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, my
own ethical sense was altered by the misfortune of working on their final
habeas corpus appeals." The State of Florida's heinousness findings in
the two cases demonstrate the ethical problems presented by focusing pri-
marily on circumstantial evidence.
The trial court made the following findings of fact relevant to heinous-
ness in the prosecution of Ted Bundy for the murder of Kimberly Leach:
[T]he victim was a twelve year old female junior high school student
attending the Lake City Junior High School. The Defendant kid-
napped her from the said Junior High School sometime between 9
and 10 a.m. on February 9, 1978, and her deteriorated body was
found in a hog pen approximately 45 miles from the scene of abduc-
tion on April 7, 1978. The victim died of homicidal violence to the
neck region of the body. At the time the body was found it was un-
clothed except for a pullover shirt around the neck. There were
semen stains in the crotch of her panties found near the body. Blood
was found on the bluejeans also found near her body, and there were
83. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
84. None of the discussion herein violates judicial confidentiality. My views are my own and not
those of the judge for whom I worked. Moreover, the issues raised in the final appeals did not directly
address the heinousness issue.
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tears and rips in some of her clothes. The Court finds this kid-
napping was indeed heinous, atrocious and cruel in that it was ex-
tremely wicked, shockingly evil, vile and with utter indifference to
human life.'
In Bundy v. State,' the Florida Supreme Court reversed the trial judge's
finding of heinousness.
Another trial court made the following findings of fact relevant to
heinousness in the prosecution of Dennis Adams for the murder of Trisa
Thornley:
[TIhe capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel ....
[T]he autopsy.., showed a bruise on one arm, inflicted prior to
death, ... swelling in the hands induced by tight binding with tape
prior to death .... [T]he autopsy showed that the body was a nude
body of an eight year old girl whose hands were tightly taped behind
her back prior to death, which showed that Trisa Gail Thornley had
time to anticipate her murder and that the autopsy and photographs
showed seven coils of rope with circumference of nine and three-
fourths inches around the neck... , and that the child's body was
placed in a plastic garbage bag and thrown in a wooded area some
three miles from her home.'
In State v. Adams,88 the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the trial
court's finding of heinousness.
Apart from the additional physical evidence of sexual abuse present in
the Bundy case, the similarity between the circumstances relied on by the
judges in the two cases is striking. Wholly apart from the question of
whether the ultimate sentences themselves were merited, one could strongly
argue that given the state's focus on similar circumstances, the considera-
tion of the heinousness factor in both cases should have been the same. If
anything, stronger evidence of sexual abuse would seem to make Bundy's
crime more heinous, although his victim was four years older. The result
in these cases casts doubt on the strongest argument that can be made in
favor of focusing on circumstance rather than mental state-that predictabil-
ity is enhanced.
An ad hoe inquiry into mental state, rather than circumstance, is not
necessarily more predictable, but predictability is only one goal of sen-
tencing. Another critical goal is the labeling of the behavior meriting
85. Statev. Bundy, No. 79-149-CF, slip op. at 3-4 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1980), quoted in Bundyv. State,
471 So. 2d 9, 21 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 894 (1986).
86. 471 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 894 (1986).
87. Statev. Adams, No. 78-474 CF, slip op. at4 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1979), quoted in Statev. Adams,
412 So. 2d 850, 856 (Fla.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882 (1982).
88. 412 So. 2d 850 (Fla.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882 (1982).
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retribution by the state. An execution is a communicative act whereby the
state names, correctly or incorrectly, what is most evil in people. A read-
ing of Lewis would suggest that what makes a crime especially heinous is
the mental state of the murderer, not the circumstances surrounding the act
of killing.'
For example, Ted Bundy killed purposefully-to possess as fully as
possible the body and life force of his victim. He is the classic Un-man:
devoid of empathy, completely self-centered, and above all social norms.
His enjoyment of killing for its own sake is what renders his crime hei-
nous. On the other hand, Dennis Adams was a hardworking prison guard
with no criminal record or history of violence.' He was spurred to a
homicidal catatonia by his wife's chronic infidelity-she spent the night
before the murder sleeping with one of Adams's co-workers across the
street from their house.9' He confessed to the crime.' Although his
behavior was inexcusable and his execution may be defensible, he was a
much different type of killer than Bundy. He looks more like a version of
Medea than like the prototypical Un-man. Whether or not the State of
Florida should treat Medea and the Un-man differently, its current focus
on circumstance rather than mental state appears to lead to arbitrary
results.
The state, however, buoyed by Inferno, could argue that a rigid focus
on circumstance might reduce arbitrariness, asserting that our notions of
punishment are equally well informed by the type of crime. For example,
each circle in Dante's Hell is reserved for specific types of crimes.
Wouldn't clear rules for heinousness based on the circumstances of the
murder be consistent with Dante's cosmology? Florida's equating of chok-
ing a conscious victim to death with special heinousness seems to take such
an approach. A set of bright-line rules might be desirable. Maybe the
correct response to the comparison of Bundy and Adams should be to in-
tensify the focus on circumstance: murdering children is per se heinous, or
concealing remains is per se heinous. This suggestion, if consistently
applied (a big if), might lead to greater predictability, but it does injustice
to Dante. Not all murderers go to Hell. Dante's purgatory contains mur-
derers who confessed their sin and asked for forgiveness.' Mental state
is hardly irrelevant to Dante. Mental state sends one to Hell-circumstance
merely helps determine the type of punishment. In fact, severity of
89. The facts surrounding the crime will, of course, often provide strong clues as to mental state--
the fact a victim was tortured reveals a lot about the mental state of the defendant.
90. Adamns, 412 So. 2d at 854.
91. Id. at 857.
92. See id. at 851 (stating that the defendant's involvement in the crime was shown through cir-
cumstantial evidence and the defendant's oral and written statements to police officers).
93. DANTE AuoHmwI, PUROATORIO (Laurence Binyon trans., Macmillan & Co. 1938).
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punishment is closely related to mental state. Francesca and Paolo,
suicidal lovers who fell victim to their own erotic passions, are less far
down in Hell than those who killed in betrayal.'
Inferno then cannot really be read as supporting the notion that special
heinousness as an aggravating factor should be determined merely from
looking at the circumstances surrounding the crime." In the final analy-
sis, Dante and Lewis both make mental state critical. If mental state is the
key, then a focus on circumstances does a poor job of separating the Un-
man from Medea.
Of course, the question remains whether Medea should be treated
identically to the Un-man. I believe the answer should be no. When the
fax machine chattered the death of Ted Bundy, I felt ambivalent. The exe-
cution of Dennis Adams continues to trouble me. The trial court found
three aggravating factors in his case and three mitigating factors.' Had
the Florida Supreme Court invalidated the finding of heinousness in his
case, as it did in Bundy's, the balance would have tipped in his favor. The
vast majority of people cannot imagine committing a crime such as
Adams's, yet most have felt the rage and disorientation of rejection by a
loved one.
In a recent essay, Nussbaum explores the lessons of Seneca's Medea
and concludes:
The message to the Aristotelian is, then, that there is no combining
deep personal love with moral purity. If you set yourself up to be
a person who cherishes all the virtues, whose every act is done justly
and appropriately, towards the right person in the right way at the
right time, you had better omit erotic love, as the Stoics do. If you
admit it, you will almost surely be led outside the boundaries of the
virtues; for this one constituent part likes to threaten and question all
the others. And then the very perfectionism of the Aristotelian, who
so wants all of life to fit harmoniously together, will produce rage
upon rage--angry violence towards one's own violence, a sword
aimed at one's own aggression.Y
If Medea's violence is a natural, although unacceptable, outgrowth of erotic
love, then it is hard to label the violence heinous. Acknowledging the
94. Francesca and Paolo were found in the second circle of Hell, see DANTE, supra note 2, canto
5, at 37, whereas those who killed in betrayal were found in the ninth circle of Hell, see id. canto 32,
at 271-77. For a discussion by Nussbaum of the differences between Medea's erotic nature and
Francesca's "erotic flame that is 'quickly kindled in the gentle heart,'" see Nussbaum, supra note 61,
at 335, 335-36.
95. The attempt, however, is useful to illustrate a misuse of literature and also to demonstrate the
possibility of convincingly diffusing the attempt.
96. Adam, 412 So. 2d at 854.
97. Nussbaum, supra note 61, at 336.
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destructive capacity of love should not lead us to condemn it because "if
we leave love out, as the play also teaches us, we leave out a force of
unsurpassed wonder and power."" As a community, we will sometimes
pay the price for choosing to accept the gift of eros. Because we choose
love, we find Medea's crimes tragic, but not heinous. The Un-man, on the
other hand, is not the outgrowth of any part of our nature we choose as a
community to embrace. His nihilistic spirit may lurk within us, but we
have no excuse to feed and nurture it.
Only a focus on mental state and the interior life of the particular
defendant can fully reveal the distinctions that lie at the heart of Maynard
v. Cartwright. Although the inquiry at issue is conducted within the brutal
confines of capital sentencing procedure, the purpose of the inquiry is in-
herently merciful. In examining the contrast between epieikeia (roughly
translated as "mercy") and di&k (roughly translated as "retribution"),
Nussbaum concludes that notions of retribution are most appropriately
focused on a category of crime unconcerned with the individual crimi-
nal,' while equity and mercy are exercised when the "notions of inten-
tion, choice, reflection, deliberation, and character that are part of a
nonreductive intentionalist psychology" are applied to the particular in-
dividual at issue."
Her understanding of mercy leads Nussbaum's "ideal judge [to be] un-
ashamedly mentalistic" and to treat "the inner world of the defendant as a
deep and complex place."1"' This inner world is considered "[l]ike a
novel"" °z and is "based on a highly particularized perception of the char-
acter's [defendant's] situation. " "n Most importantly, she concludes that
"the motives for mercy are engendered in the structure of literary percep-
tion itself.""°4 In other words, mercy can be exercised only when we
seek to understand the individual's mental state. She properly rejects
Holmes's "conflat[ion of] the retributive idea with the idea of looking to
the wrongdoer's state of mind, implying that an interest in the 'insides'
invariably brings retributivism with it.""° Perhaps equity and mercy are
the strongest reasons to reject Florida's crime-specific approach to heinous-
ness.
To conclude, I think that the strongest thesis-strongest in the sense
of most specific-that can be supported by a reading of Euripides, Dante,
98. Id.
99. See Nussbaum, supra note 5, at 111-13 (agreeing that retributive notions should be based on
external standards).
100. Id. at 111.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 110.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 109.
105. Id. at 112.
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and Lewis is that Medea's crimes are not heinous for the purposes of
Maynard, but that the Un-man's are. An intermediate thesis suggests more
generally that a focus on mental state rather than circumstance would re-
duce arbitrariness in determining heinousness and improve and refine the
labeling function of punishment." A yet broader suggestion might be
made that Euripides, Dante, and Lewis improve the quality of the heinous-
ness debate, raising the ethical level of the discussion irrespective of what
standard the state eventually decides to implement. On the most general
level, the consideration of particular works of literature helps to identify
the ethical parameters of specific legal issues.
IV.
Having completed a discrete and somewhat practical exercise, this
Essay will conclude by examining what theoretical claims should be made
for this sort of incorporation of literature into law. One crass claim might
be that literature merely provides a ready source of metaphor and, for the
crafty lawyer, an effective rhetorical weapon. According to Nussbaum,
however, talking about the works of artists like Euripides, Dante, and
Lewis is an ethical exercise, part of the constant re-examination of how to
live."°7 If James Boyd White is correct, this rigor would extend beyond
our own discrete selves to the world and, more concretely, to the question
of how we should constitute ourselves in community with others."°8 Not
only the works discussed herein, but also the whole corpus of literature,
and indeed all art, is potentially relevant to making ethical choices, includ-
ing legal decisions. They are particularly fertile sources of wisdom to be
integrated into legal rules, not mere tools of persuasion.
The claim that literature is highly relevant to law, however, must be
separated from the claim that exposure to literature will ultimately render
the law just or even enable us to articulate a clear definition of justice.
Nussbaum's explanation of the ethics of reading does not include a set of
behavioral prescriptions for us, nor a tidy list of truths she has found. By
the same token, although an ethical conception of law demands the incorpo-
ration of literature, such an incorporation will not enable us to construct a
106. In holding that the term "pitiless" was not unconstitutionally ambiguous, the Supreme Court
remarked that
some within the broad class of first-degree murders do exhibit feeling. Some, for exam-
ple, kill with anger, jealousy, revenge, or a variety of other emotions.... Idaho has
identified the subclass of defendants who kill without feeling or sympathy as more deserv-
ing of death. By doing so, it has narrowed in a meaningful way the category of defen-
dants upon whom capital punishment may be imposed.
Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 1534, 1543, 1541-43 (1993) (emphasis in original).
107. See NUSSAUM, supra note 4, at 40-43 (challenging the view that emotions, as represented
in novels, are unreliable as a basis for practical wisdom).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 15-16.
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comprehensive list of just legal rules. Justice is out there, but we cannot
often be very sure of its particulars. To paraphrase Professor Carter, at
best we dance around the truth.1°9
The ethical conception suggested here might be best illustrated with
one final literary example. The simultaneous embracing of objective truth
and rejecting of grand claims about its content is the core of Blaise Pascal's
conception of God. Pascal's notion of a "hidden God" emerges from his
extending "paradox to God himself," and making Him "both certain and
uncertain, present and absent" and thus opening a new chapter in the histo-
ry of philosophical thought.110 According to Pascal, God exists-and so,
therefore, truth in an objective sense-but is mostly hidden. Human ra-
tionality, although evidence of the divine spark, is incapable of fully
realizing justice or truth. We can meditate, read, pray, and make intel-
ligent guesses as to the nature of the cosmos, but we are far too fragmented
and broken to put the puzzle together. According to Pascal, "[w]e possess
truth and goodness only in part, and mingled with falsehood and evil.""'
Pascal suggests that justice exists-that natural law contains right and
wrong answers to legal questions. The hidden nature of God, however,
prevents us from perceiving justice clearly. A combination of intuition,
reason, and experience reveals some things with relative certainty-for
example, that murder is bad-but mostly we grope for the truth. Like
Plato's cave dwellers, we can only make guesses from the shadows we see
playing on the walls of our cave. Literature provides many shadows for
us to scrutinize and discuss. We may misapply our learning, but we are
at least proceeding in good faith.
Nussbaum's ethical claims are similarly modest: We pursue wisdom
when we read literature. What we ultimately find is another matter. We
can, however, remain faithful to the ethics of the pursuit. The existential
nature of the pursuit is not a denial of an ultimate reality, but a recognition
of human frailty.
This frailty must be recognized when we look to literature for help in
making legal decisions, especially when the legal pronouncement may be
death. In some well-known contexts-for example, the Spanish Inquisi-
tion-what is called "truthseeking" becomes synonymous with dehumaniza-
tion. Only the constant recognition of the frailty of human judgment can
forestall the dangerous confluence of intellectual arrogance and claims of
truth. Labeling a murderer an Un-man can be an unjust and manipulative
109. For Carter, the dance is the truth. See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 19, at 9 ("'Truth,' defined
as it is by personal experience, varies according to each of our separate and unique experiences.").
110. LuciEN GOLDMANN, THE HIDDEN GOD 198 (Philip Thody trans., Humanities Press 1964)
(1955).
111. BLAISs PASCAL, PENSAES Fragment 385, at 104 (W.F. Trotter trans., E.P. Dutton & Co.
1931) (1670).
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act of dehumanization, but it may also be the ethical identification and
classification of the ultimate indulgence of the darkest side of human
nature. Under current constitutional law, execution is clearly permissible.
Whether we like it or not, states will exercise that power. If we remember
our frailty, literature may help humanize the process. After all, an
inquisition has a hard time surviving The Brothers Karamazov.
Literature may help us approximate a just legal rule, but human nature
stands in the way of the establishment of justice. That nature, however,
is not entirely base. We are at least capable of embarking on the
Aristotelian inquiry, and, therefore, literature can be a valuable part of the
ethical groping we call legal decisionmaking. Talking about Euripides,
Dante, and Lewis does not guarantee just decisions, but such talk is an
essential part of a more ethical decisionmaking process.
V.
The predominant view of law and literature as exemplified by James
Boyd White, Stanley Fish, and Lief Carter can only partially be reconciled
with the position taken in this Essay. For White, both law and literature
are processes through which we constitute ourselves and generate commu-
nity values. Fish and Carter share this view to the extent that value and
meaning arise organically from the community, and not from on high.
Law, therefore, is not truthseeking, but truthmaking. The Nussbaum-
Pascalian contribution (if I can call it that) is to create a framework that
enables us to make ethical choices without setting ourselves up as gods,
arrogantly ready to impose our perceptions of truth upon all dissenters.
We incorporate literature into law in the hope of better defining the sha-
dows that play on the wall of our cave. Because we cannot avoid living
in community, we extend to the law itself our personal ethical inquiry into
the good. Talking about Euripides, Dante, and Lewis in response to
Maynard v. Cartwright provides one possible illustration of how this exten-
sion can profitably be accomplished.
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